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Abstract
Live operating systems and virtualisation allow a known, defined, safe and secure execution environment to be
loaded in to a PC’s memory and executed with either minimal or possibly no reliance on the PC’s internal hard
disk drive. The ability to boot a live operating system or load a virtual environment (containing an operating
system) from a USB storage device allows a secure portable execution environment to be created. Portable
execution environments have typically been used by technologists, for example to recover data from a failing PC
internal hard disk drive or to perform forensic analysis. However, with the commercial potential of portable
execution environments becoming realised the requirement for such environments to be secure is becoming
increasingly important. To be considered truly secure a portable execution environment should require
authentication prior to loading the executing environment (from the USB mass storage device) and provide full
encryption of the whole mass storage device.
This paper discusses the outcomes from building four portable execution environments, using commercially
available and/or freeware technologies. An overview is given of the emerging commercial requirement for
secure portable USB execution environments, the security threats addressed and research performed in the
area. The technologies and products considered in the review are outlined together with rationale behind the
selection. The findings from the implementation of the four portable execution environments are discussed
including successes, failures and difficulties encountered. A set of security requirements is defined which is used
to gauge the effectiveness of each of the four environments.
Keywords
USB boot, Live Operating Systems, Virtualisation, Encryption, Pre-boot Authentication, Post-boot
Authentication, U3 technology.

INTRODUCTION
Live operating systems (OS) are designed to be loaded from a Compact Disk (CD) or a Universal Serial Bus
(USB) storage device into a PC’s Random Access Memory (RAM) and execute without necessarily having
access to the PC’s Hard Disk Drive (HDD). A live OS enables a user to rapidly boot an execution environment
and execute an application on an available PC without having to install the application on the respective PC
HDD; a live OS can provide a platform for a Portable Execution Environment (PEE). Using a USB storage
device to hold and load the OS (and applications) provides a number of advantages over a CD based live OS
(and applications); advantages include a faster load time, the ability to store data generated during a session,
configuring the storage device to provide OS swap space (page file/virtual memory) and a more convenient size
and shape to a regular CD. However, a notable disadvantage of a USB storage device over a CD is the
inconsistent support provided by the different manufacturer’s PC Basic Input Output System (BIOS) to allow
the booting of a live OS from a USB storage device.
Virtualisation (often referred to as virtual machines or virtual environments) provides an abstract execution
environment separate from the physical PC. There are a number of different types of virtual machine (VM)
(CSIRO 2008). The type of virtualisation considered in this paper is a VM that runs within (on top of) the PC
operating system; often referred to as a type 2 hosted VM. A “guest” OS is hosted within the type 2 VM and the
application is executed within the guest OS. A VM and its guest OS and application can be loaded from a USB
storage device into an executing PC to provide a PEE.
The prolific growth in public Internet access centres (e.g. Internet cafes, airport lounges, wireless hot spots, etc)
allow an individual to perform sensitive transactions, like Internet banking, on PCs for which no level of trust
can be assumed, i.e. these PCs and/or any communication infrastructure may contain malicious software. Also a
lack of best practice security (e.g. anti-virus and anti-spyware software and modem/router enabled firewall
capabilities) in many homes can result in malicious software residing on PCs unbeknown to the owner/user.
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Malicious software is capable of capturing and exploiting user credentials (enabling identity theft/fraud to occur)
and/or stealing sensitive data when a user is conducting an Internet transaction.
Secure PEEs provide an opportunity for organisations to distribute an Internet application on a USB storage
device that can be used safely on PCs which may contain malicious software. In this paper the following
business scenario is presented to provide the context for the provision of a secure PEE.
A compact and easily transportable secure PEE device is distributed by an organisation to individuals
for a specific purpose. The secure PEE contains an application that interacts with a server over the
Internet. The individual will use the secure PEE device and its application on PCs for which no level
of trust can be assumed, therefore the secure PEE device must provide an environment that can protect
against malicious software, i.e. the integrity of the secure PEE must be preserved. It is important that
the PEE can be reliably loaded into any PC.
The secure PEE device should also allow the application or individual to save data on to the secure
PEE device. The data may be sensitive and therefore protecting the confidentiality of the data is
important. Stored data should be accessible by the individual (when the secure PEE is not being used)
from a PC running Windows XP. Any stored data is likely to be sensitive and therefore protecting the
confidentiality of the data is important.
The secure PEE device, due to its compact nature, could easily be mislaid and therefore ensuring its
contents can not be exploited is paramount.
To satisfy the above business scenario a secure PEE device would utilise authentication prior to loading the
PEE, data encryption, information separation, user/application authentication and device attestation. In this
paper a range of available technologies are considered to construct USB based secure PEE devices. The
approach adopted is to consider a secure PEE device constructed using a standard thumb drive and available
open source technologies and then progressively consider increasingly more sophisticated and expensive
technologies that provide additional security capabilities.
Four secure PEEs were constructed that provide the underlying security infrastructure to enable applications to
perform secure Internet transactions. The security technologies required by an application to perform Internet
transactions are not considered to be within the scope of this paper. The following four PEE devices were
constructed:
•

Secure PEE Device 1 - Standard Flash Memory Device: A low cost thumb drive with bootable OS, an
OS in a VM, partitioning and software based encrypted storage.

•

Secure PEE Device 2 - U3 Flash Memory Device: A U3 thumb drive (SanDisk 2008) with bootable
OS, an OS in a VM, partitioning and encrypted storage.

•

Secure PEE Device 3 - Hardware Encrypted Flash Memory Device: The IronKey thumb drive
(IronKey 2008) incorporating hardware based encryption with an OS in a VM.

•

Secure PEE Device 4 - Portable Hardware Encrypted Hard Disk Drive: The Pocket Silicon Data Vault
(SDV) (SecureSystems 2008) incorporating hardware based encryption with bootable OS, an OS in a
VM and cryptographically separated partitions.

Each secure PEE device is assessed to gauge the effectiveness of the technologies utilised to counter a set of key
threats and satisfy a set of security requirements.
The following terms are used throughout the paper, a definition is therefore given for each:
•

secure PEE device: the secure platform/infrastructure consisting of a USB mass storage device
configured with a secure PEE, secure storage space and possibly hardware based security
mechanisms/technologies (e.g. encryption and secure partitions if available).

•

secure PEE: the trusted OS, trusted application(s), security technologies (e.g. authentication and
software encryption) and the appropriately configured hardware security mechanisms (if any) of the
secure PEE device.

•

secure PEE OS: the trusted OS component of the secure PEE.

•

trusted OS: an OS that has been acknowledged as secure by the supplier and users. To be considered
trusted the OS may have a reduced set of hardened functionality and/or been subjected to independent
rigorous evaluation and testing.

•

PEE: a portable execution environment that does not necessarily have any security technology nor has
been specifically configured to be secure.

•

portable storage device: a USB flash device (often know as a thumb drive or pen drive) or a USB
HDD packaged in a portable enclosure.

SECURE PORTABLE EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS – THE REQUIREMENT
Emerging Business Requirement
Live OS’, VMs and other portable software, executable from CDs and USB storage devices have been available
for a number of years; enabling PEEs to be built. Traditionally such PEEs were typically used by technicians to
perform PC maintenance activities (e.g. data recovery from a corrupt or failing HDD) or by specialist IT
security/forensics specialists as ‘tools of the trade’.
The large data and financial losses organisations and individuals are suffering through malicious software
exploiting Internet transactions is well known and documented. Organisations are increasingly looking for
assurance that Internet based transactions can be performed securely and that user credentials and data will not
be compromised. However, when an organisation allows a service to be provided over the Internet it is not able
to control the environment from where the service is initiated, and therefore gaining assurance that a transaction
has been performed securely is not possible. To combat the data and financial losses organisations are starting to
consider the distribution of secure PEE devices to their staff and/or customers to protect against malicious
software and enable secure Internet transactions to be performed.
Notable research on the provision of secure portable applications and secure PEEs includes the work conducted
by the Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and its proof of concept Trust
Extension Device (TED) (Chan et al 2007 & Nepal et al 2007). The CSIRO work focussed on trust portability,
where a VM is used to encapsulate a trusted computing environment in to a USB storage device that can be
plugged in an untrusted PC and used to perform secure Internet transactions. The key requirement of the TED
research was to provide an ‘on demand’ secure PEE where the user and device identity, and the integrity of the
execution environment could be confirmed. The research and development focussed on user, application and
device attestation to ensure identities could be confirmed before an application performing an Internet
transaction was initiated. Similar research into the use of VMs to provide trusted/secure PEEs has been
performed at Stanford (Garfinkel et al 2003) and Princeton (Kwan et al 2007).
The CSIRO work was based on requirements gathered from a user forum with members drawn from the finance
sector, government agencies and other service organisations all of whom had mobile workers and/or customers.
The user forum identified the need for secure PEEs that enable secure Internet transaction to be performed. The
CSIRO TED proof of concept device did not implement the secure infrastructure considered (in this paper) as
vital underlying security technology in the provision of a secure PEE.
Threat Environment Addressed
It is proposed in this paper that a secure PEE device provide countermeasures to address the following three key
threats:
1.

Malicious software (residing on a host PC) capturing user credentials and data.

2.

Sensitive data remnants (resulting from an application storing temporary information) residing on a
host PC’s HDD following the completion of an Internet transaction; and

3.

As a result of loss or theft, unauthorised access is gained to (sensitive) data held on an unsecured USB
storage device that was used to store data generated during an Internet transaction.

Security Requirements
It is proposed in this paper that a secure PEE needs to provide functionality to address the following security
requirements:
•

The secure PEE shall only allow authorised users to load the resident OS/application(s) and access
stored data.

•

The secure PEE shall preserve the integrity of the resident OS and application(s) from malicious
software and other external attacks.

•

The secure PEE shall preserve the confidentiality of any stored data from external attacks including
theft of the device.

•

The secure PEE shall leave no data remnants on the host PC hard disk drive (HDD) following the
completion of a user session.

•

The secure PEE shall prevent the acquisition of data from the device through the use of forensic
analysis techniques, if the device were to be lost/stolen.

•

The secure PEE shall confirm both the identity of the user and the device before allowing an Internet
transaction to occur.

These security requirements will be used to gauge the security strength of the four constructed secure PEEs.
Secure PEE – An Overview of the Required Functionality
To address the security requirements and threats identified above, and to enable the aforementioned scenario to
be satisfied it is proposed in this paper that a secure PEE would ideally utilise the following functionality:
•

Bootable secure PEE OS (pre-boot secure PEE OS): Cold booting a (trusted) live OS from the a
secure USB PEE device onto a host PC provides a secure platform as the user can have a high degree
of assurance that no malicious software will be present, i.e. any malicious software that was active on
the host PC would be eliminated by the power-off required prior to the cold boot. However, booting a
live OS from a USB device is neither user friendly nor reliable. To boot a live OS from a USB device
requires the boot order to be changed. Some new PCs allow the user to select the boot device at power
up whilst other PCs require a user to set the boot order in the PC BIOS. Whilst setting the boot order is
not a technically complex task the following aspects make the process unfriendly and unreliable:
o

There are many different types of BIOS and there is no standard set of keystrokes to enter the
BIOS and change the boot order.

o

Some older PC’s do not support booting from a USB device.

o

Older PC’s usually only support USB1.1 which can make the booting of a live OS a slow
process.

o

Some public access PCs password protect the BIOS which can prevent a user changing the PC
boot order.

Although loading an OS from a cold boot provides a secure platform, given the unfriendly aspects of USB
booting means it should not be considered as the only method of loading a secure PEE into a host PC.
•

Secure PEE in VM (post-boot PEE): As booting a secure PEE directly from a USB storage device has
some usability problems an alternative approach to providing a secure platform is to load a VM
containing a secure PEE. VMs provide security through isolation, however VMs are susceptible to the
following vulnerabilities:
o

Keyloggers:
keystrokes.

The host OS may contain malicious software that can capture and store

o

Screen shot logging: The host OS may contain malicious software that can capture and store
screens.

o

Memory Probing/Attacks: The host OS may contain malicious software that can capture the
contents of RAM utilised by the VM.

The business scenario calls for a secure PEE that can be reliably loaded on a range of PCs and protect
against malicious software. A bootable OS protects against malicious software but cannot be reliably
loaded. Conversely VMs are susceptible to malicious software but can be easily and reliably loaded.
Therefore secure PEEs were built that have both a bootable OS and a VM with a guest OS; allowing
the user to select the secure PEE OS that suits the user and/or operating environment. Note – it should
be assumed that the bootable OS and VM guest OS are identical and support the same (trusted)
application which executes identically on both bootable OS and VM guest OS.
•

Authentication: A secure PEE device should not be accessible until the user has entered authentication
credentials. The following two authentication methods are considered:
o

Pre-boot: The most secure way to authenticate a user is before the live OS or host OS is
loaded; it is highly unlikely that malicious software (such as keyloggers) can be present as the
respective OS will be loaded from a cold boot. In pre-boot authentication an application is
loaded into the PC upon power up and the user authenticates with the secure PEE device.
However, pre-boot authentication will experience the same set of pre-boot problems identified
above for a bootable secure PEE OS, i.e. pre-boot authentication can be secure but unfriendly
to initiate.

o

Post-boot: A more convenient approach to authenticate a secure PEE device is to plug it into
a PC that has a booted and executing OS. In post-boot authentication a PC either uploads an
authentication application from the secure PEE device or a pre-installed authentication
application is resident on the PC. Through the authentication application a user authenticates
with the secure PEE device. However, post-boot authentication can be subject to attack by
malicious software (e.g. keyloggers) resident within the host PC.

Where possible, secure PEE devices will be built that can support both pre-boot and post-boot
authentication.
•

Device encryption: To preserve the confidentiality of the secure PEE OS and data residing on the USB
device, on-the-fly encryption is required. On-the fly-encryption can be provided by software or
hardware; this paper will consider both software and hardware encryption.

•

A secure PEE that does not store data on the host PC HDD: To prevent data remnants residing on the
host PC HDD following the use of a secure PEE, the secure PEE device must be configured to:
o

provide swap space (virtual memory/page file) for the secure PEE OS on the secure PEE
device itself; and

o

ensure the secure PEE OS and application(s) write all temporary information to available
allocated space on the secure PEE device.

•

Ability to separate the PEE OS and data: To preserve the integrity of the PEE OS and any stored data
the secure PEE device should support storage partitioning and role based differentiated access rights to
partitions. Such partitioning allows separation and isolation to be achieved.

•

Protection of PEE OS and data: In addition to the provision of a partitioning capability a secure PEE
should also allow a partition to be defined as Read-Only; such partitions can be used to protect the
integrity of the PEE OS from malicious software. Read-Only partitions can also be used to protect the
integrity of ‘valued’ data.

•

User, application and device authentication and attestation: To enable a secure Internet transaction to
occur an application on the secure PEE device needs to mutually authenticate with a remote server
providing the service. Assurance is required that the application and secure PEE device are genuine;
therefore device and application attestation technology is required. The techniques and technology
required to perform application and device mutual authentication and attestation with a remote server
are considered beyond the scope of this paper.

THE TECHNOLOGIES/PRODUCTS SELECTED
The range of technologies that satisfy the functionality requirements and enable secure PEE devices to be
constructed is growing rapidly. The technologies considered in this paper represent what the author considers to
be amongst the best available at the time of writing (May/June 2008). Both freeware and proprietary
technologies were considered. A summary is given below of the technologies and products utilised to build the
four secure PEE devices.
The Live Operating System
A range of live OS’ were considered, including Windows MiniPE, Ubuntu, Puppy Linux and Slax. Following
an evaluation of a set of live OS’ the Linux distribution Slax (Slax 2008) was selected. Slax is a cut down Linux
distribution based on Slackware and has been developed primarily as a live OS. Slax was selected for the
following reasons:
•

The ease with which Slax could be installed on a USB storage device as a bootable OS
(PendriveLinux.com-Slax 2008).

•

The quality of documentation available (Wielenge 2008).

•

The compact yet functionally rich distribution which rapidly loads into a PC’s RAM.

•

The ability to boot first time every time on a range of PCs and allow Internet access without any
configuration of the OS.

•

Slax was rated best live OS on “The LiveCD List” (Brand 2008).

The other OS’ considered presented a range of problems including inability to boot from a USB device without
time consuming configuration, slow to load, would not load into a PC with limited RAM and would not load
consistently into a range of different PCs.
For the purposes of this paper Slax is assumed to be secure and is considered to be a trusted OS. In practice the
OS selected would be subject to analysis to harden and remove functionality considered unnecessary for a
secure PEE. Version 6.0.6 of Slax was used.
Virtual Environment
The virtual environment Qemu was selected for the review. Qemu (Bellard 2008) is a freeware type 2 VM.
Qemu has gained widespread recognition as an effective VM due to the ease by which it can be used and
configured (Hannay & James 2007). Qemu was selected for the following reasons:
•

It is an extensively tried and tested open source VM.

•

It can be loaded from a USB storage device on to a PC executing Windows XP without requiring any
installation or Windows XP administrator privileges; although this approach to using Qemu does result
in slower execution times for the guest OS and application(s).

•

A Qemu image containing Slax
(PendriveLimux.com-Qemu 2008)

was

readily

available

from

www.pendrivelinux.com

Software Encryption
The open source, freeware application Truecrypt (TrueCrypt 2008) was selected to provide software encryption.
Truecrypt is a comprehensive application providing encryption for PC HDDs and portable storage devices.
Truecrypt has a traveller mode option that allows a number of encrypted volumes to be placed onto a USB
storage device and then accessed from any PC. When a USB storage device is configured with traveller mode a
Truecrypt autoexec application (known as the ‘traveler disk’) is placed on to the USB device; the Truecrypt
application is obviously in unencrypted form. When the USB device is plugged into a PC the user is given the
option to execute Truecrypt where upon, following successful authentication, a Truecrypt volume on the device
is mounted and appears as a Windows removable device.
Truecrypt was selected for the following reasons:
•

It is an extensively tried and tested open source package.

•

It provides strong ‘on the fly’ encryption, allowing selection from a variety of crypto and hashing
algorithms.

•

It is well documented (TrueCrypt-Foundation 2008).

•

It is one of only a few freeware packages that support encrypted volumes on portable storage devices.

•

The autoexec/automount feature uses the standard Windows XP popup.

•

A Truecrypt volume can be mounted Read-Only.

Some of the limitations of the Truecrypt traveller mode option include:
•

the requirement for the host PC to be executing with Windows administrator mode.

•

it is not possible to encrypt a whole storage device partition (in traveller mode).

•

Truecrypt volumes can be identified on a storage device.

•

only one volume can be automounted.

•

the autoexec application is easily identifiable on the storage device and therefore susceptible to attack.

U3
A U3 flash drive was selected as one of the platforms for the secure
PEE device. U3 technology (SanDisk 2008) allows a user to load a set
of applications, and launch them from a U3 flash drive whenever the
U3 flash drive is plugged into a PC executing Windows XP. The
seamless launch of applications is achieved by the U3 hardware (the U3
chip) reserving a small part of the device (containing an ISO image)
that is interpreted by Windows XP as a CDROM. When the U3 device
is plugged into a PC executing Windows XP an autoexec of the ISO
image occurs. The U3 ISO provides an interface that allows
applications to be selected and launched.

Figure 1: An example of a U3
USB flash memory device

As can be seen from Figure 1, a U3 flash device looks like a standard thumb drive2. U3 flash devices are widely
used and some interesting applications of the technology have been achieved (Al-Zarouni 2006). A U3 flash
drive was included in the research because:
•

it provides a more sophisticated USB flash drive

•

given the wide scale adoption of U3 devices it was considered important to determine how effective a
U3 device would be when configured and used as a PEE device.

Hardware Encryption
Whilst software based encryption provides adequate data protection to preserve the confidentiality for many
organisations it is considered insufficient to protect highly sensitive data and applications. The main
vulnerability is that the data encryption key for a software encryption package is stored in a PC’s RAM (during
operation) and therefore potentially subject to capture. Recent research performed by a team from Princeton (J
Alex Haldermany et al 2008) has shown that under certain circumstances it is possible to retrieve an encryption
key from a PC’s RAM even after the PC has been powered down. Hardware based encryption usually stores
the encryption key in the hardware crypto engine on the storage device.
It is considered particularly important that a secure PEE device support hardware encryption due to the way
secure PEE devices will be distributed and used. Two storage devices that use hardware based encryption were
selected; IronKey and the Pocket Silicon Data Vault (SDV). Both devices have a crypto engine implemented on
a integrated circuit located within the enclosure or the storage device.
IronKey
Since mid 2007 an increasing number of USB flash storage devices
(packaged as thumb drives) have become available with full storage
encryption performed by an integral hardware crypto engine; IronKey is
an example of such a device. An IronKey is slightly larger than a
typical thumb drive.

Figure 2: An example of a
IronKey flash memory device
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Figure 2 presents a pictorial image of an IronKey and Figure 33 presents a cross sectional image of an IronKey
showing the crypto & access control chip and flash memory. The IronKey chip controls all access to the flash
memory.

Figure 3: Pictorial cross-section of IronKey

Some of the important features of IronKey include:
•

Post-boot authentication – the IronKey has implemented a “U3 like” feature where the IronKey chip
reserves a small part of the device that is interpreted by Windows XP as a CDROM. When the
IronKey is plugged into the PC an autoexec of an authentication application occurs.

•

Strong encryption – the IronKey crypto engine implements the strong 128 bit Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES).

•

Key escrow (key recovery) – when the IronKey is first initialised a key escrow capability ensures that if
the authentication credentials are forgotten they can be recovered from the IronKey website.

•

Key destruction – after ten failed authentication attempts the IronKey encryption key(s) are destroyed
and the device becomes unusable.

IronKey was selected due to its compact form factor (it is only slightly larger than a standard USB thumb drive
(pen drive). The IronKey does however have the following limitations:
•

Support for Windows XP/Vista only – an IronKey can only be authenticated with XP/Vista. As
Windows only recognises the first partition on a thumb drive the IronKey can only be recognised as a
single partitioned device.

•

Key escrow limitation – the IronKey key recovery facility requires the user to remember a set of web
authentication credentials. Also as the recovery key and authentication credentials are held outside the
user’s control the assurance afforded to their security can not be guaranteed.

•

No pre-boot support - an IronKey can only be authenticated by post-boot authentication.

Pocket SDV
The Pocket SDV is a portable 2.5 inch form factor HDD. The Pocket
SDV contains an ‘SDV chip’ which controls access to an interal 1.8
inch HDD. The SDV chip encrypts all data written to the 1.8 inch
HDD. There are two modes of authentication supported by the Portable
SDV; pre-boot and post-boot authentication. When authenticating using
the pre-boot method the host system will boot off the attached Portable
SDV and the Authentication Application (AA) will be launched from
the Portable SDV's on-board flash memory. Once successful
authentication has been performed the secure PEE is loaded.
Authentication via the post-boot method requires that the Portable
Authentication Application (PAA) is installed on the host PC.

Figure 4: An example of a Pocket
SDV HDD

Once successful authentication has been achieved the Pocket SDV allows access to data based on pre-defined
access rights. The Pocket SDV supports differentiated access rights, i.e. user profiles can be defined with
permissions to access different parts of the integral HDD.
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Figure 4 provides a pictorial image of the Pocket SDV4. The key functionality and attributes of the Pocket SDV
can be summarised as:
•

Full disk encryption - all data on the Pocket SDV is encrypted; with encryption performed at the sector
level which reduces the possibility that pattern matching can be performed to break the encryption.

•

Totally independent of PC Operating System - the Pocket SDV behaves like a standard USB mass
storage device and has no dependencies upon the PC operating system; it works with Linux as well as
Windows.

•

Multiple Partitions - up to 15 partitions (drives/volumes) can be defined for a Pocket SDV with each
partition cryptographically separated from the other partitions by its own cryptographic key.

•

Differentiated Access Rights & User Profiles - a Pocket SDV allows user profiles (roles) to be defined
with different authentication credentials and access rights allowing different parts of the Pocket SDV
integral HDD to be accessed according to the selected user profile.

The Pocket SDV was selected due to its comprehensive functionality; however it does have the following
limitations:
•

Form factor – the shape and size of the Pocket SDV is not as convenient as the USB thumb drive.

•

Pre-installation of PAA – post-boot authentication can only be performed after the PAA has been
installed onto the host PC.

BUILDING SECURE PORTABLE EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS
Host PC Technology Constraints
The following constraints in the host PC technology influence how secure PEEs can be constructed:
1.

Unfriendly PC BIOS’ and a lack of user experience changing a PC boot order can result in problems
when assigning a secure PEE device as the first boot device.

2.

Windows XP only supports FAT (File Allocation Table) file systems for USB flash devices.

3.

Windows XP only supports access to the first FAT partition (volume/drive) on a USB flash drive5.

It is again worth reviewing both the BIOS boot and VM vulnerability issues as building secure PEEs that
address these issues is an important proposition in this paper. Changing a PC BIOS setting can be difficult,
inconvenient and in some instances impossible to change (i.e. the BIOS is locked). Building a secure PEE based
purely on a bootable OS is impractical. As noted above, to provide both a high level of security and
convenience the secure PEEs constructed will contain both a bootable (trusted) OS & application(s) and a
loadable VM containing a (trusted) OS & application. The bootable OS provides the most secure execution
environment but it is an unfriendly activity to enable a secure PEE device to be the first boot device.
Alternatively loading a VM with a guest OS is a user friendly action but is vulnerable to attacks from malicious
software that may be resident on the host PC. By providing a secure PEE with multiple partitions with a
bootable OS in one partition and a VM with a guest OS in another partition, allows the user to select either
execution environment based upon:

4

•

user skill level.

•

allowed access to the PC BIOS.

•

access to PC power on/off switch.

•

the level of trust that can be placed in the host PC.

•

user convenience.

Image obtained from Secure Systems web site.
This is not the case for a USB portable HDD where Windows drivers will mount all FAT partitions on the
HDD.
5

The Windows limitation of only supporting FAT file systems on a flash drive and also only recognising the first
partition identified on a flash device limits the opportunity to provide an elegant secure PEE solution using a
single partition. A single partition could be used to hold a bootable OS, a VM (with OS) and user generated
data. However, a single partition solution would not readily support encryption and data separation and
therefore the aforementioned secure PEE requirements for confidentiality, integrity and preventing data
remnants would be difficult (probably impossible) to satisfy. One solution to overcome this Windows limitation
and satisfy the secure PEE requirements is to use multiple partitions (a mixture of FAT and Linux file systems)
as described below.
Secure PEE Configuration Decisions
Secure PEE devices were built using multiple partitions; this approach enables certain secure PEE requirements
and aspects of the business scenario to be achieved for secure PEE devices built using USB flash drives.
It is important the first partition on a secure PEE device has a FAT file system so that it is recognised by
Windows XP, if the first partition were to be a Linux partition Windows would not be able mount it and as only
the first partition is recognised by a USB flash device no other partitions on the device would be mounted.
Whilst the selected OS (Slax) can be installed as a bootable OS on a FAT partition it must however be the first
partition. If the bootable OS is in the first partition then it will not be possible to have a VM in a second
partition that can be loaded into a PC executing Windows XP. Therefore the first partition on a secure PEE
device must be a FAT file system containing the VM and guest (trusted) OS and application(s).
A Linux ext3 partition was required as the second partition to hold a bootable copy of Slax. The boot loader
‘lilo’ was used to configure the Slax Master Boot Record (MBR) so that Slax would boot from the second
partition.
An outcome from the use of a Linux partition is that when the user is accessing the secure PEE device from
Windows XP the Linux partition is not mounted and therefore the possibility of the bootable OS being attacked
or corrupted is reduced.
Secure PEE Configuration Model
Based on the above configuration decisions the configuration model
presented in Figure 5 defines a target configuration for a secure PEE
device. For each secure PEE constructed an attempt was made to
implement the target configuration model. The configuration model
presents four partitions. The first is a Windows (FAT 16/32) partition
containing a VM hosting an OS with additional space for operational
data. The second partition is a Linux partition with a bootable OS.
Ideally the first and second partitions will be Read-Only partitions with
the Read-Only mechanism enforced by the secure PEE device
infrastructure. The third (Linux) partition will be swap space for both
the VM guest OS and the bootable OS. Finally the fourth partition
(with a FAT file system) will provide storage space for user generated
data; whilst the fourth partition is a target requirement in practice it is
only possible for a secure PEE implemented on a USB portable HDD.
All partitions will be primary partitions and ideally fully encrypted.
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Figure 5: Target Configuration
Model

Secure PEE Device 1 - Implementation on a Standard Flash Memory Device
The flash memory device used was a Buffalo 2GB high speed thumb
drive. The target configuration model could not be fully achieved as
only one FAT file system can be mounted; therefore the first partition
was used for the VM and user created data. Figure 6 models the
implemented configuration. Truecrypt was used to protect the VM and
user generated data; two truecrypt volumes (containers) were generated
in the first partition, one for the VM (containing Slax and an
application) and another for user generated data – the truecrypt volumes
provided separation. The second and third partitions were Linux
partitions; the second an ext 3 (journaling) file system for a bootable
Slax and the third an ext2 file system for OS swap space – the swap
partition was used by both the VM running Slax or the bootable Slax.

Figure 6: Configuration Model for
Secure PEE Device 1

The following observations were made during the construction and testing of secure PEE device 1:
•

The Slax distribution included the script “liloinst.sh” which allowed the second partition on the secure
PEE device to be easily configured as a bootable partition.

•

Booting Slax from the second partition was tested on a range of PCs and only once (on a Dell 5400 PC)
did it fail to boot.

•

Ubuntu (on a live CD) with fdisk provided a simple system to configure the device’s partition table, file
systems and bootable version of Slax.

•

The truecrypt volumes were easy to create and use, they could however be identified on the secure PEE
device.

•

When truecrypt was configured for autoexec and the secure PEE device was plugged into the host PC a
standard Windows ‘removable device’ popup appeared, from which the truecrypt option could be
selected resulting in the truecrypt authentication screen appearing. Upon successful authentication the
first partition on the secure PEE device is opened as a ‘removable device’ with a truecrypt label.

•

When truecrypt was configured for ‘automount upon authentication’ the truecrypt volume containing
the VM was automatically mounted. Only one truecrypt volume could be automounted.
The
automounted truecrypt volume is presented as a ‘removable device’ by Windows XP.

•

The VM and its guest OS executed from a truecrypt volume without problems, however when the
truecrypt automount Read-Only feature was used for the truecrypt volume containing the VM, the VM
encountered problems booting Slax (the guest OS). Therefore it may not be possible to protect the
integrity of the VM & its guest OS by using the truecrypt Read-Only mechanism.

•

When the truecrypt volume used to store and protect user generated data was mounted it was mounted
as a ‘local disk’ rather than a ‘removable device’, which could confuse a user.

•

Limited testing showed that both the bootable OS and VM guest OS appeared to use the swap partition
successfully, albeit with some degradation of performance.

Secure PEE Device 2 - Implementation on a U3 Flash Memory Device
The U3 device used was a SanDisk 2GB flash drive. Like the secure
PEE device 1, the target configuration model could not be fully
achieved as only one FAT file system can be mounted. Therefore the
first partition was used for the VM and user generated data. Figure 7
models the implemented configuration. Also, like secure PEE device 1,
truecrypt was used to protect the VM and user generated data. The
second and third partitions were Linux partitions and configured
exactly like secure PEE device 1.

Figure 7: Configuration Model for
Secure PEE Device 2

The following observations were made during the construction and testing of secure PEE device 2:
•

Most of the observations made above with respect to secure PEE device 1 were found to apply to the
U3 based secure PEE device 2. The notable differences occurred when the U3 authentication feature
was enabled, as highlighted below.

•

The truecrypt automount works with U3. The U3 red cruzer icon appears in addition to the windows
popup enabling truecrypt to be selected.

•

The U3 (post-boot) Windows authentication feature prevents any upload from the U3 device until
successfully authentication. Therefore the truecrypt autoexec and automount features could not be
utilised if the U3 authentication feature was enabled.

•

Although a post-boot authentication mechanism, if the U3 authentication is enabled the secure PEE
bootable OS was blocked from loading. Similarly if the U3 secure PEE device was plugged into a host
PC running Linux no access to any partitions was possible, i.e. the U3 authentication feature appears to
block all access to the device until successful authentication.

•

When the two truecrypt volumes (in the first partition) were mounted each volume was labelled as a
‘local disk’, whilst the U3 secure PEE device first partition is labelled as a ‘removable disk’; this
approach to labelling truecrypt volumes differs from secure PEE device 1. As each truecrypt volume
‘local disk’ label only differs by the drive letter it may be difficult for a user to distinguish the VM
volume and the data volume.

Secure PEE Device 3 - Implementation on a Hardware Encrypted Flash Memory Device (IronKey)
The IronKey could not be configured to achieve the target configuration
model due to its Windows only based authentication feature. The
IronKey authentication feature prevents any access to the IronKey until
successful authentication; therefore neither could a bootable OS be
installed nor was it possible to use Ubuntu to set up separate partitions
for the VM, user generated data and swap space. Figure 8 models the
IronKey secure PEE device configuration; essentially it is the standard
IronKey containing a VM and separate directory structure for user
generated data.
Figure 8: Configuration Model for
Secure PEE Device 3

The following observations were made during the construction and testing of secure PEE device 3:
•

Establishing the encryption keys (via the creation of the authentication credentials) both for the
IronKey and the key recover capability (via the IronKey web site) was a user friendly seamless set of
actions.

•

The IronKey was tested on numerous host PCs running Windows XP and successfully authenticated
(based on the insertion of the correct credentials).

•

As would be expected the secure PEE VM and guest OS loaded from the IronKey correctly.

Secure PEE Device 4 - Implementation on a Hardware Encrypted Hard Disk Drive (Pocket SDV)
The Pocket SDV was able to be configured to fully satisfy the target
configuration model. As the Pocket SDV is a USB HDD, Windows is
able to detect and mount all FAT partitions on the HDD; therefore both
the first and fourth partitions are accessible on the Pocket SDV secure
PEE device. The following configuration could be achieved for the
secure PEE device 4:
•
•

•

The first and second partitions were set as Read-Only, to
protect the integrity of the VM and bootable OS.
A separate Read-Write data partition was created to separate
and protect user generated data as required by the reference
target configuration.
As a further integrity protection measure, different user
profiles were created with different access rights to partitions;
a pre-boot profile denied access to partition 1 and a post-boot
profile denied access to partition 2.
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Figure 9: Configuration Model for
Secure PEE Device 4

The following observations were made during the construction and testing of secure PEE device 4:
•

The Pocket SDV System Administration Utility (SAU) allowed partitions, user profiles and access
rights to be created. Although the SAU was an intuitive application it was extremely important to spend
some time reading the detailed System Administration manual before configuration commenced.

•

Testing of pre-boot authentication and subsequent booting of the secure PEE OS worked on all PCs
tested.

•

The post-boot PAA had to be installed on the host PC and also required Windows XP service pack 2
and .net 2.0 to be installed, proving less flexible than the other three secure PEE devices.

•

Once installed the PAA consistently allowed authentication and loading of the VM.

A QUALATATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURE PEE DEVICES
The required features and functionality of the four secure PEE devices was driven primarily by the capabilities
required to satisfy the business scenario and the countermeasures required to address the identified threats. A
set of security requirements were defined to allow a comparative analysis of the four secure PEE devices to be
performed; the comparative analysis is given below. As would be expected the security requirements overlap
with security aspects of the business scenario and threat countermeasures. Before performing the comparative
analysis, the capabilities of the four secure PEE devices are summarised against the requirements of the business
scenario and countermeasures required for the threats.
Satisfying the Business Scenario
The key aspects of the scenario are identified together with a summary of how the four secure PEEs provide
appropriate functionality to address the scenario.
A compact and easily transportable secure PEE device: Three of the four secure PEEs were implemented on
thumb drives. The Pocket SDV whilst compact is in a less transportable form.
The individual will use the secure PEE device and its application on PCs for which no level of trust can be
assumed, therefore the secure PEE device must provide an environment that can protect against malicious
software: Two secure PEE OS environments are provided. Where a user is concerned about the trustworthiness
of a PC the bootable OS can be used. Read-Only partitions were configured (where possible) to protect the
secure PEE against corruption by malicious software.
It is important that the PEE can be reliably loaded into any PC: The less secure, but easy to load VM based
secure PEE provides a high level of reliability.
The secure PEE device should also allow the application or individual to save data on to the secure PEE
device: Three of the four secure PEEs were able to be configured to provide a separate secure volume/partition
for user generated data.
Protecting the confidentiality of the data is important: All of the secure PEEs enforced user authentication to
deny access to unauthorised users coupled with storage encryption to protect the confidentiality of data.
Stored data should be accessible by the individual (when the secure PEE is not being used) from a PC
running Windows XP: All four secure PEEs were configured to enable user generated data to be easily stored
and retrieved.
The secure PEE device, due to its compact nature, could easily be mislaid and therefore ensuring its contents
can not be exploited is paramount: User authentication and encryption protect the contents of the secure PEE
device.
Counter Measures to Address Threats
Threat - Malicious software (residing on a host PC) capturing user credentials and data: Countermeasure Using the bootable OS capability of the secure PEE device will ensure no malicious software is present to
capture user credentials and data. If the VM capability of the secure PEE is used it is more difficult to prevent
the capture of user credentials and data, therefore it is assumed a user will not use the VM if the host PC is
considered to be likely to have been compromised by malicious software.
Threat - Sensitive data remnants (resulting from an application storing temporary information) residing on a
host PC’s HDD following the completion of an Internet transaction: Countermeasure - The secure PEE
device swap partition will prevent data remnants in the form of page files being written to the host PC HDD. It
is assumed that a secure PEE OS and Internet based application which are considered to be trusted will have
been hardened to prevent any temporary data being written to the host PC HDD.
Threat - As a result of loss or theft, unauthorised access is gained to (sensitive) data held on an unsecured
USB storage device that was used to store data generated during an Internet transaction: Countermeasure User authentication and encryption will prevent access by unauthorised personnel to user generated data
following the loss or theft of a secure PEE device.

Comparative Analysis Security Strength of Secure PEE
Table 1 provides a comparative analysis of the security strength of the secure PEEs by presenting for each
security requirement a statement of compliance for each secure PEE; with the strongest secure PEE highlighted.

Secure PEE Features that Address the Requirements
Device 1: Std Flash

Device 2: U3

Device 3:
IronKey

Only allow
authorised users to
load the resident
OS/application(s)
and access stored
data

Post-boot authentication via
truecrypt password. Only
authorised users can gain
access to the 2 truecrypt
volumes; however access to
non-encrypted storage space
is possible. No pre-boot
authentication therefore
unauthorised users can gain
access to bootable OS.

Post-boot authentication via
truecrypt password. Only
authorised users can gain
access to the 2 truecrypt
volumes; however access to
non-encrypted storage space
is possible, unless U3
password used. No pre-boot
authentication therefore
unauthorised users can gain
access to bootable OS.

Post-boot
authentication via
IronKey password. No
access can be gained
to the device until
successful
authentication. No
pre-boot
authentication,
however no bootable
OS is available.

Both strong pre-boot
and post- boot
authentication. No
access can be gained
to the device until
successful
authentication.

Preserve the
integrity of the
resident OS and
application(s) from
malicious software
and other external
attacks

Partitioning provides
separation and isolation.
Although truecrypt can
mount a volume Read-Only,
running a VM and OS
inside a truecrypt ReadOnly volume failed. Further
analysis and testing of the
Read-Only feature is
required.

Partitioning provides
separation and isolation.
Although truecrypt can
mount a volume Read-Only,
running a VM and OS inside
a truecrypt Read-Only
volume failed. Further
analysis and testing of the
Read-Only feature is
required.

No partitioning and no
Read-Only
mechanism. Once
successful
authentication has
been achieved the
device is open to any
read and write access.

Partitioning provides
separation and
isolation. Integrity can
be preserved by the
Read-Only capability.
Read-Only and NoAccess permissions
can be set per
partition per user
profile, i.e. different
profiles can have
different access rights
to the same partition.

Preserve the
confidentiality of
any stored data
from external
attacks including
theft of the device

User generated data is
stored in a truecrypt
encrypted volume.

User generated data is stored
in a truecrypt encrypted
volume.

User generated data is
protected by fully
hardware based
encryption.

User generated data is
protected by fully
hardware based
encryption. Each
partition has its own
encryption key, if one
is broken then only
one partition at most
is exposed.

Leave no data
remnants on the
host PC hard disk
drive (HDD)
following the
completion of a user
session

By utilising the swap
partition on the device no
page files are written to
the host PC.

By utilising the swap
partition on the device no
page files are written to the
host PC.

The IronKey can not
be configured with a
swap partition.

By utilising the swap
partition on the device
no page files are
written to the host PC.

Prevent the
acquisition of data
from the device
through the use of
forensic analysis
techniques, if the
device were to be
lost/stolen

256 bit AES truecrypt
volumes will prevent
acquisition; however
software encryption is not
as strong as hardware
encryption6.

256 bit AES truecrypt
volumes will prevent
acquisition; however
software encryption is not as
strong as hardware
encryption.

128 bit AES
hardware based
encryption will stop
even the most
sophisticated highly
resourced forensic
investigation.

128 bit AES hardware
based encryption will
stop even the most
sophisticated highly
resourced forensic
investigation.

Requirements

Confirm both the
identity of the user
and the device
before allowing an
Internet transaction
to occur

Device 4: SDV

This requirement is considered out of scope in this paper.

Table 1

6

Software encryption keys reside in the host PC RAM and therefore could be captured by a determined, highly
skilled and well resourced forensic analyst (J Alex Haldermany et al 2008)

CONCLUSION
Four secure PEEs were built and tested using a range of freeware and commercial off the shelf technologies. A
brief summary of each secure PEE device is given together with areas that could be subject to further
investigation.
Secure PEE Device 1 - Implementation on a Standard Flash Memory Device: Secure PEE 1 was the cheapest
solution to construct, it provides a reasonable capability that addresses many of the security requirements,
counters the threats and could be used under certain circumstances within the given business scenario. It would
not be suitable as a turnkey solution that could be supplied to an organisation’s customers to perform secure
transactions. It is conceivable however that such a secure PEE device could be distributed to a ‘controlled
audience’ for a specific application. For instance an organisation could distribute the secure PEE device to a
certain group of employees with fixed operational instructions.
Secure PEE Device 2 - Implementation on a U3 Flash Memory Device: The secure PEE features and
functionality of this device are identical to secure PEE device 1, but instead uses a U3 thumb drive as its
platform which provides a strong titanium enclosure, the ‘U3 chip’ and a post-boot authentication mechanism.
As per secure PEE device 1, the device is probably not suitable for a turnkey application; it would however
provide a more robust platform than secure PEE device 1 for a ‘controlled audience’ application.
Secure PEE Device 3 - Implementation on a Hardware Encrypted Flash Memory Device (IronKey): The secure
PEE built using the Ironkey had fewer features than the other secure PEE devices. It did provide a strong
platform with hardware based encryption and authentication. Secure PEE device 3 did not provide the best
platform for use in the business scenario presented.
Secure PEE Device 4 - Implementation on a Hardware Encrypted Hard Disk Drive (Pocket SDV): Secure PEE
device 4 provided the best functionality to satisfy the security requirements and counter the threats. It would be
the best secure PEE to use as a solution for the business scenario presented in this paper. The Pocket SDV does
have a number of disadvantages, including its size, shape and weight compared to the other secure PEE devices
considered, and it is also not as robust as platforms like the IronKey and U3.
The work presented in this paper was defined to be a contained and complete piece of research. However, a
number of areas for further investigation arose during the research including:
•

Determine if a VM and guest OS can be configured to execute within a true crypt Read-Only volume.

•

Determine if truecrypt can be launched from the U3 CD partition as other applications have been
configured to do (Al-Zarouni & Al-Harji 2007).
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